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29 November 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Current Intelligence Review for  
November 1974

1. During my review of the NID, the NIB, and the DIN for November, I covered 33 items that fell within my area of interest. My analysis of these reveals the following:

The NIB carried the largest number--14, the NID was second most prolific--11, and the DINs covered only 8.

As to the utility of the pieces for National level consumption, only two items (one each from the NID and the DIN) were considered of major value; 19 items (8 NID, 8 NIB, and 3 DIN) were considered as marginally worth reporting; and 12 (2 NID, 6 NIB, and 4 DIN) were rated as fillers.

In their relationship to KIQs, only two (both DINs) were of major value, 19 (6 NID, 9 NIB, and 4 DIN) had slight peripheral impact, and 12 (5 NID, 5 NIB, 2 DIN) had no relationship.

Of the total of 33 items, 23 concerned the USSR, 9 China, and 1 was devoted to a Soviet surface-to-air missile system in East Germany.

Of the 23 items on the USSR, 8 were mere reportorials on ICBM test firings. This type

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of data has, in my opinion, little if any utility at the National level. It is of primary interest to analysts who probably already have the data anyway.

All of the items had to do with military matters and most of them would be of some interest at the Unified and Specified command level and below.

The NIB and the NID stood, in most instances, head and shoulders above the DINs in their clarity, the amount of analysis, continuity, etc. The NID also outshone the NIB somewhat, especially in pieces containing in-depth analysis.

One criticism that can be directed at all three publications is the lack of continuity in many instances. While I have said that I don't feel that day-to-day reporting on ICBM tests is particularly useful, it would at least be better if significant highlights of a test could be set forth. For example, most consumers are interested in how the MIRV programs are coming along, and the rush to report a test without waiting to get information on whether or not MIRVs were involved leaves the reader with either a feeling of frustration or of ho-hum.

2. It is probably too early in the exercise to make any firm judgments, but if this month proves to be typical, I believe that we will have a strong case for recommending some alteration in the current intelligence procedures and functions.

Attachment:

Work Sheet

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